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Common resources are quasi-public resources, which are rivaled but non excludable in 
consumption or in appropriation. While the exploitation of common resources has been 
widely  studied  in  the  literature  originated  by  Elinor  Ostron’s  works  (starting  from 
1990),  the  study  of  common  resources  inside  entrepreneurial  organization  in  not 
sufficiently developed to date. This paper establishes three dimensions that highlight the 
relevance  of  the  communality  of  resources  in  entrepreneurial  organizations:  the 
accumulation  and  use  of  common  capital  resources  owned  by  the  organization;  the 
distribution of a rivaled, but non excludable value added among the controlling patrons; 
and the management of common non-owned resources (for example natural resources) 
by  the  organization.  The  first  theme  is  selected  and  developed  further.  Cooperative 
firms  are  introduced  are  instance  of  ownership  form  that  appears,  historically  and 
institutionally, to be particularly keen to accumulate, use, distribute common resources.  
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1.  Introduction 
The study of the management of common resources became prominent over the last 
decades  in  the  economic  literature  in  correspondence  with  the  mounting  evidence  of  the 
necessity  to  achieve  sustainability  in  the  exploitation  of  natural  resources.  Governance 
mechanisms and conflict resolution procedures came under closer scrutiny as key elements 
allowing to overcome the well-known tragedy of the commons problem (Hardin, 1968). Most 
of  the  literature  on  common-pool  resources  came  to  concentrate  on  forms  of  communal 
ownership that cannot be assimilated neither to public, nor to private ownership (Ostrom, 
1990).  Communal  ownership  usually  implies  the  right  to  exploit  the  stock  of  resources 
without depleting their ability to generate equivalent flows of resources in the future (e.g. 
exploitation of rain forests for wood production) (Ostrom, 1990, p. 30). Communal ownership 
implies the non-excludability from consumption or appropriation of rivaled resources by the 
controlling constituencies. At the same time, non-controlling subjects are excluded from the 
exploitation  of  the  resource.  Common  ownership  appears  as  private  ownership  to  people 
excluded  from  their  utilization,  while  they  are  non-excludable,  but  rivaled  for  people 
participating to their utilization.
1 Institutional contrivances are devised to exclude the subjects 
not  pertaining  to  the  relevant  constituencies  of  appropriators  while,  at  the  same  time, 
processes of definition of the appropriation rights of the included patrons are observed.  
Both theoretical and empirical studies have highlighted the fact that, given the rivalry and 
non-excludability of common pool resources, conflict over their appropriation is unavoidably 
endemic.  Technologies  and  governing  rules  serve  the  function  of  regulating  appropriation 
while limiting conflict and punishing defectors (Ratner et al., 2010). This is achieved not only 
through  control  and  punishment  of  defectors,  but  also  through  coordination  mechanisms 
stressing the importance of stakeholder involvement (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2006; Poteete et al., 
2010) for example in the definition of appropriation rights and in patrolling their realization.   
The analysis of the exploitation of common-pool resources has been mainly limited, to date, to 
the study of natural resources. However, it is possible to envisage that the same analysis is 
applied  to  other  economic  domains,  for  example  to  the  organization  of  production  in 
entrepreneurial  organization.  The  paucity  of  analysis  in  this  field  may  be  due  to  the 
concentrated (private or public) nature of ownership in most business organization, a feature 
that, as we shall see, limits the economic relevance of resources communality.  This study 
endeavors to single out three relevant dimensions for the study of common pool resources in 
entrepreneurial organizations:  
·  the accumulation and use of common capital resources: all business organization need 
to accumulate owned capital resources in order to self-finance investments and to build 
collateral guarantees offered to external financiers. The use of these resources can be 
characterized  by  communality  when  decisions  about  investments  are  taken  in 
collectively by the controlling patrons. When investments are at least partially sunk 
(the exit option is costly) and the controlling members can have heterogeneous and/or 
conflicting  objectives,  the  rivaled  and  non-excludable  nature  of  common  capital 
resources becomes relevant; 
                                                 
1 Wikipedia defines common-pool resources as it follows: “In common property regimes, access to the resource 
is not free, and common-pool resources are not public goods. While there is relatively free but monitored access 
to the resource system for community members, there are mechanisms in place which allow the community to 
exclude outsiders from using its resource. Thus, in a common property regime, a common-pool resource appears 
as a private good to an outsider and as a common good to an insider of the community. The resource units 
withdrawn from the system are typically owned individually by the appropriators. A common property good is 
rivaled in consumption”.   4 
·  the distribution of a rivaled, but non excludable value added: the remuneration of the 
factors of production is always rivaled given the production of a limited value added. 
This implies that a higher remuneration of some specific subjects or of one specific 
group of patrons necessarily implies a lower remuneration of other patrons. At the 
same  time,  distribution  is  often  characterized  by  a  relevant  degree  of  non-
excludability. This happens, for example, when the remuneration of labor services or 
the setting of prices is informed by equity criteria; 
·  the  management  of  common  natural,  historical  and  cultural  resources:  in  some 
specific  instances  business  organizations  can  find  themselves  to  manage  for 
commercial purposes resources that have public relevance (e.g. natural resources or the 
cultural and historical patrimony). In this case non-excludability is given by the public 
relevance of the resources that dictates that the resources is not depleted or otherwise 
spoiled.   
The most widespread ownership forms in contemporary economies are the public and the 
private for-profit ones. To this, the cooperative, or mutual benefit form of ownership is to be 
added, since it represent a third typology whose diffusion is limited, but not marginal.
2  
 
1.1. The utilization of common-pool resources in private for-profit and publicly owned firms 
In private for profit firms capital resources can show a high degree of communality when the 
firm is owned as a joint stock company. In this case the capital of the firm is managed in 
common  by  stockholders,  and  its  use  is  rivaled,  but  non-excludable.  The  sunk  nature  of 
specific investments makes communality an enduring feature in the life of the entrepreneurial 
venture.    Commonality  of  capital  resources  in  for  profit  firms  is  not  to  be  considered, 
however, a generalized phenomenon, but rather it involves only a subset of this firm category 
since a high percentage of for profit firms show concentrated and exclusive ownership. In this 
case  commonality  of  capital  ownership
3  can  be  considered  absent  since  all  the  relevant 
decisions concerning the accumulation and use of capital resources are taken by one or by a 
limited set of subjects. When only decision maker is present, rivalry in the utilization of 
resources is absent, while all the other stakeholders of the organization are understood as 
contractual  parties  who  are  excluded  from  decision  concerning  the  utilization  of  the 
resources. Furthermore, even in the presence of pronounced phenomena of rivalry and non-
excludability, stockholders in for-profit firms can transfer the ownership of shares at any 
time. That is, the exit option can compensate and counterbalance the growth of governance 
costs connected with common ownership. As it will better emerge in the following sections, a 
new institutionalist interpretation of this phenomenon dictates that concentrated ownership is 
understood as an effective way to eschew the costs of governance connected with the rivaled 
and non-excludable nature of common ownership. Communality in the distribution of value 
added in private for-profit firms is limited, but important as well. On the one hand, non-
                                                 
2 A fourth typology of ownership, the social or public benefit one, may be added when dealing with not-for-
profit entrepreneurial organizations which have an entrepreneurial character (Weisbrod, 1988; Hanmann, 1996). 
This fourth case will be taken into consideration as well, but in a more tangential way since is it thought to 
represent a newer  and less well defined form of ownership.   
3 The most widespread definitions of ownership of an assets concern residual rights of control and appropriation 
of the net residual, implying also that the asset is at the owner disposition for sale, conversion or elimiation 
(Hansmann, 1988). In this study, when dealing with common ownership, reference is made to residual control 
rights and to the appropriation of the proceedings coming from the owned assets, in a way similar to usufruct 
rights. As it is better explained in the following section, common ownership excludes in most cases the freedom 
to sell, eliminate or convert the asset.   5 
excludability can be connected with bargaining between different stakeholders (most often 
investors, customers, and employees) over the distribution of the value added. On the other 
hand, some stakeholders can be remunerated of the basis of “equity” criteria, more than on 
the basis of purely “efficiency” criteria. The example of worker remuneration can be put 
forward  again,  since  equity  criteria  can  determine  a  relevant  degree  of  distributive  non-
excludability  in  wage  determination  (Frank,  1984;  Stark,  1990;  Levine,  1991;  Clark  and 
Oswald, 1996).4 To be sure, the relevance of communality in distributive processes in for-
profit firms is reduced by the lack of involvement in decision making of all the stakeholders 
other than investors (most often of employed workers and customers). The reason is that 
impoverished  or  absent  involvement  heightens  the  degree  of  distributive  excludability. 
Finally,  the  role  of  for  profit  firms  in  managing  natural  and  cultural  resources  can  be 
considered  limited,  since  their  utilization  is  often  unprofitable  for  commercial  purposes 
(Weisbrod, 1988).  
The role of publicly owned enterprises in the accumulation, distribution and use of common 
capital resources is to be considered limited as well. Public ownership of production activities 
excludes, as a rule, the existence of net residuals or their appropriation by the controlling 
stakeholders. Distributive processes are, in terms of communality of resources, similar to the 
case of for-profit firms since most stakeholder, apart from the public controlling authority, are 
only  weakly  involved  in  these  processes  (one  example  of  such  involvement  concerns  the 
existence of public sector labor unions). Finally, public management of common natural and 
cultural  resources  is  often  not  understood  as  an  entrepreneurial  venture,  but  as  a  simpler 
administrative service. Hence it falls outside the boundaries of this study. 
 
1.2. Common pool resources in cooperative, mutual benefit enterprises  
The organizational forms have shown the greatest compatibility with the interpretation of the 
firm  as  a  nexus  of  a  common-pool  resource  are  mutual  benefit  organizations,  mainly 
cooperative firms. In mutual benefit organizations, both historically and in institutional terms, 
the communality of resources appears central in all three areas of concern of this study: 
5  
￿  The accumulation and use of common capital resources: Most existing cooperative 
forms accumulate all or a relevant part of their surpluses in indivisible reserves of 
capital  (asset  lock  or  trust  funds).  This  is  primarily  done  in  order  to  self-finance 
investments,  to  build  collateral  guarantee,  and  to  insure  members  against  future 
negative contingencies (Navarra, 2010). Democratic governance underpins both a high 
degree of  rivalry and non-excludability in the use of capital assets accumulated by 
means of indivisible reserves: different members of groups of members may prefer 
                                                 
4  Among  the  most  classical  studies  on  equity  in  wage  determination,  Frank  (1984)  argued  that  egalitarian 
internal wage structures arise because of “equity” considerations, a concept that he equates with that of status; 
Stark (1990) took account of relative status deprivation in order to explain why workers are usually not paid 
their  marginal  product;  Levine  (1991)  argued  that  group  cohesiveness  and  lower  wage  dispersion  increase 
efficiency in participatory firms, thereby explaining involuntary unemployment among blue collars, who are 
paid above-market wages in order to boost their compliance with the firm’s objectives. In some studies, worker 
satisfaction as a proxy for individual well-being has been connected with distributive fairness taking the form of 
comparison wage rates (Clark and Oswald, 1996). 
5 Institutional solutions similar to the ones characterizing cooperative firms are found also in other not-for-profit 
organizational forms, such as nonprofit organizations and, more recently, social enterprises. However, these 
organizational forms are intended to pursue public benefit purposes more than mutual benefit ones. Because of 
this reason, their surpluses and assets may be excluded in the public interest from the appropriation of the 
controlling stakeholders.    6 
alternative and incompatible investment programs while, at one and the same time, the 
existence  of  membership  rights  dictates  that  all  demands  coming  from  the 
memberships are taken into account in formulating investment programs. 
￿  The  distribution  of  a  rivaled,  but  non  excludable  value  added:  Cooperatives  are 
democratically  managed  on  the  basis  of  the  “one  member,  one  vote”  rule,  which 
implies that also distribution of the produced value added needs to take membership 
rights into account. This happens, normally, on the basis of rules self-defined by the 
membership.  Non-investor  stakeholders  directly  participate  in  the  definition  of 
distributive patterns. Hence, non-excludability is brought to bear on distribution. The 
distribution of rivaled resources needs to account for both “equity” and “efficiency” 
criteria.
6  For  example,  all  workers  in  worker  cooperatives  can  be  guaranteed  a 
minimum  wage  beyond  other  distributive  rules  such  as  individual  productivity, 
seniority and role. Since distribution on the basis of need satisfaction or equity can be 
in  contrast,  at  least  in  some  cases,  with  efficiency  criteria  such  as  merit,  rules 
conjugating equity and efficiency are required to govern distributive tensions.
7 
￿  The management of common natural and cultural resources: The embedded nature of 
cooperative firms, which has been evidenced by various authors (for example Borzaga 
and  Tortia,  2010),  is  tantamount  to  a  criteria  of  closeness  to  the  satisfaction  of 
community needs and to participation in endogenously defined development processes 
(Borzaga and Tortia, 2009). The embeddedness of cooperative members is likely to 
entail relevant consequences for the management and exploitation of local resources, 
among which natural, historical and cultural resources, which show a high degree of 
non-excludability  at  the  community  level.  For  example,  cooperatives  are  often 
involved in public programs aiming at guaranteeing environmental sustainability, or in 
partnerships  with  the  public  sector  aimed  at  satisfying  the  basic  needs  of  their 
membership (e.g. housing plans for worker and producer members).  
This paper is set to analyze in depth the first case of communality, the one concerning 
accumulation of capital in indivisible reserves. One reason for this choice is the difficulty to 
deal exhaustively with all three cases of communality in the same paper. A second reason is 
the existence of a well developed theoretical and empirical literature analyzing the positive 
and  negative  imports  of  common  resources  in  terms  of  indivisible  reserves  of  capital  in 
cooperative firms. As it is well-known, this literature was born in 1970 with the parallel works 
by  Vanek,  and  by  Furubotn  and  Pejovich  who,  in  their  analyses,  mainly  referred  to  the 
institutional system of the former Yugoslav Republic. This existing stream in the economic 
literature can be fruitfully reinterpreted in light of more recent approaches dealing with the 
govern of common-pool resources. The analysis of the second and third case of communality 
is left to future work.  
The remaining of the paper is organized as it follows: Section 2 singles out the nature 
and economic relevance of common capital resources in cooperative firms. Section 3 deal with 
the determinants of the emergence and dimension of common-pool resources in the form of 
                                                 
6 Rivalry in the distribution of resources is also evident, since the utilization of resources to one part of the 
membership  excludes  distribution  to  other  constituencies.  Also  in  private  and  publicly  owned  organization 
distributive  patterns  concern  rivaled  resources.  However,  in  these  cases,  non-controlling  stakeholders  are 
remunerated, as a norm, on the basis of contractual relations. This implies that they are excluded from the 
appropriation of net surpluses, and do not participate in the definition of distributive patterns. In this sense, 
distributive non-excludability is violated. 
7 For contributions concerning distributive patterns in common pool resources as natural resources the reader 
can consult, for example, Adhikari (2005).   7 
indivisible reserves held in locked assets or trusts. Section 4 deals with the governance of the 
process of accumulation and use of indivisible reserves. Section 5 draws some international 
comparisons in terms of different legal systems impacting on the processes of accumulation of 
indivisible reserves and on the performance of the cooperative system as a whole. Section 6 
concludes with some policy implications.   
 
2. The communality of capital resources in cooperatives 
The communality of resources in terms of capital accumulation is present and relevant in 
most typologies of cooperatives, but its nature appears to be quite different in supply side 
cooperatives (mainly worker and producer cooperatives) vis à vis demand side cooperatives 
(consumer, credit, user, insurance cooperatives). Supply side cooperatives solve the problem 
of  the  accumulation,  utilization,  and  distribution  of  scarce  resources  for  the  benefit  of 
producers. Non excludability concerns the restricted number of individuals or firms admitted 
in the membership, while all other subjected may be excluded on the basis of scarcity of 
available  resources.  This  kind  of  organization  often  shows  little  propensity  to  enlarge  the 
membership given the market share for its product. This implies that exclusion can be applied 
quite rigidly to non-members and membership rights guarantee a substantial role for non-
excludability among members. Demand side cooperatives may instead show a pronounced 
tendency to include as many members as possible (this is evident in the case of consumer 
cooperatives), since inclusion corresponds to the enlargement of the market share of the firm. 
Both  the  problems  of  inclusion  and  non-excludability  appear  looser,  since  the  stronger 
tendency  to  include  as  many  members  as  possible  corresponds  to  weaker  involvement, 
attenuated control rights, and weaker problems connected with non-excludability. In the case 
of consumer cooperatives, for example, the value added of the organization is to a great extent 
directed  to  remunerate  standard  factors  of  production  (non-owned  capital  and  employed 
workers), while net residuals are quite unambiguously directed to enhance consumer value 
and protection. The amount of subtractible resources, which often take the form of patronage  
refunds or rebates to members, is reduced to limited imports. The following arguments will 
therefore mainly refer to supply side cooperatives since, in their case, the problems linked 
with the communality of resources appear more pressing and relevant.  
We shall see in the remainder of this section how different problems connected with the 
self-finance of cooperative ventures can advice the accumulation of assets either as individual 
ownership  of  members,  or  as  common  ownership  of  the  cooperative  itself.  A  problem  of 
optimal  level  of  assets  held  in  common  will  be  singled  out  by  comparing  the  costs  of 
governance and the possible loss of efficiency connected with common ownership to the costs 
connected with the individual ownership of the firm assets.        
 
2.1. The problem of capital variability and demutualization 
Cooperatives  can  self-finance  themselves  by  resorting  to  two  basic  typologies  of 
financial  instruments:  either  shares  of  capital  individually  held  by  members,  or  common 
ownership of capital assets. Individualized financial assets range from equity shares, to non 
equity shares that are saleable or reimbursable at face value upon quittance of the members, to 
sheer loans held by the members of the cooperative. When instead cooperatives self finance 
themselves through asset held in common, they usually accumulate indivisible reserves or 
trust funds by reinvesting the whole or part of their net surpluses into locked asset. Indivisible 
reserves are crucial in most, but not in all institutional systems.    8 
Their  first  function  is  to  contrast  the  variability  of  capital  (Tortia,  2006).  Since 
membership rights in  cooperatives have a personal character, the ownership of capital quotas 
is exclusively attached to the person of the member. This implies that capital quotas hold by 
individual members are sold, reimbursed, or transformed into debt capital when the member 
quits the organization, i.e. individual capital quotas are not any more part of the firm owned 
resources. The intensity of capital variability is proportional to the share of the total capital 
held individually by members and to the intensity of members’ turnover. Capital variability 
can represent a serious obstacle to investment programs and to the ability of the organization 
to  obtain  credit  from  the  banking  system.  Indivisible  reserves  or  trust  funds  stabilize  the 
amount  of  capital  since  they  are  owned  by  the  organization  itself  and  not  by  individual 
members. By contrasting the variability of capital, common ownership of capital resources 
contribute to investment programs financed by owned resources, to build collateral guarantees 
for accessing bank credit, and to shield members against future risks.  
A  second  function  of  common  ownership  in  cooperatives  is  to  contrast  the  risk  of 
demutualization, i.e. the transformation of cooperatives into investor owned firms. The sale of 
capital  shares  individually  held  by  members  to  external  investors  can  often  lead  to 
demutualization when appropriate constraints are not put in place, or when the organization 
does not holds part of its own assets as non-saleable entities. Cooperatives have been proven 
to be subject to waves of conversions into investor owned enterprises. Demutualization has 
appeared more pronouncedly in some historical periods, for example in the UK during the 
1980s,  and  in  certain  countries,  typically  under  common  law  more  than  under  civil  law. 
Demutualization is an ordinary phenomenon in most common law countries and represent a 
normal option at the disposition of the membership as it is backed by a legal system that does 
not create important obstacles to this process. In civil law countries, instead, demutualization 
is usually considered an exception to the rule, and  tends to be implemented only in specific 
cases. In the Italian law on cooperatives, for example, demutualization is strongly discouraged 
since it amounts to the renouncement by the membership to the whole value of the assets held 
in common. In common law countries such as England and Australia, instead, cooperative 
assets are held as members’ individual ownership, which is appropriated upon conversion of 
the cooperative into investor owned company.  
Quite clearly, legislation plays a crucial role in favoring or halting demutualization. In 
countries such as Italy and Spain, all cooperatives are obliged by law to reinvest a substantial 
part  of  their  net  residuals  into  indivisible  reserves,  whose  value  may  not  be  recouped  by 
members not even when the firm is shut and stops operations (Jensen, 2011). In these cases 
the  role  of  indivisible  reserves  becomes  manifest:  the  impossibility  to,  or  the  constraints 
imposed on private appropriation creates a barrier to demutualization and favors instead a 
more stable pattern whereby the firm assets are preserved in the long term and preference is 
given to the continuation of activity over its sale, conversion, or closure. While civil law 
countries impose more constraints than common law ones, it must be noted that a substantial 
number of cooperatives, credit unions, building society, and employee owned companies in 
common  law  countries  have  been  moving  overtime  in  a  spontaneous  way  towards  the 
imposition of various constraints on demutualization. Many organizations have introduced 
forms of indivisibility for a substantial share of their owned resources, in the form of asset 
lock or trust funds (Erdal, 2011). Constraints, when not incompatible with the law, have often 
been  imposed  in  company  statues.  One  of  the  main  reasons  for  this  choice  is  that  the 
demutualization option creates incentives to discontinue operations and sale the assets of the 
firm. Incentives favoring demutualization can underpin misguided choices, for example under 
the pressure of company crises, or to the exclusive advantage of a restricted group of decision 
makers, such as managers. A second reason backing the imposition of constraints on private   9 
appropriation of company assets is that demutualization may favor in an unwarranted way the 
incumbent membership, since it allows incumbent members to appropriate the present and 
future value of the organization assets, even when they did not contribute to the creation of 
that value. To be sure, the risk of demutualization represents an ex-ante disincentive to the 
creation of cooperatives since cooperating members may not be willing to face the risk of ex-
post choices directed to private appropriation of the firm assets. A third reason is that the 
pressure towards demutualization is strongest just in the best performing cooperatives, since 
the shareable market value of the organization is higher in their case.  
The prevention of demutualization by means of accumulation of common resources has 
proven to be an effective way to eschew the risk of conversion of cooperatives into investor 
owned companies. However, at the same time, it has been accused of dampening incentives to 
invest owned resources in an efficient way and to engender undercapitalization (Furubotn and 
Pejovich, 1970) and self-selection into low value added activities (Podivinsky and Stewart, 
2006). This is the origin of the quest for the definition of an optimal amount of common 
capital resources in cooperatives. This optimal amount should be able to support the stability 
of  the  cooperative  venture  without  dampening  incentives  that  favor  higher  productivity, 
performance and investments in high value added sectors.         
 
2.2. The optimal amount of common capital resources  
Furuton  and  Pejovich  (1970),  and  Vanek  (1970)  evidenced  the  potential  distortionss 
engendered by the imposition of common property regimes. These results where referred to 
labor  managed  firms  in  the  former  Yugoslav  Republic,  in  which  the  whole  capital  stock 
existing in the economy was “socialized”. In this kind of system, given the impossibility to 
recoup  the  value  of  the  invested  capital  upon  quitting  the  organization,  members  in 
cooperatives  would  be  led  to  invest  suboptimal  amounts  of  capital.  The  dynamically 
inefficient  allocation  of  investment  funds  leads  to  the  well-known  accusations  of 
underinvestment  and  undercapitalization,  which  explains  the  inability  of  cooperatives  to 
spread  in  competitive  market  systems.  To  these  accusations,  various  answers  have  been 
attempted,  for  example  evidencing  that  various  counterexamples  do  exist  in  market 
economies.  Producer  cooperatives  are  often  able  to  achieve  adequate  degrees  of  capital 
accumulation  and  seem  able  to  escape  the  accusations  dynamic  inefficiency  (Hansmann, 
1996). Among worker cooperatives. The often cited Mondragon group of worker cooperatives 
in the Basque Regions, does accumulated indivisible reserves of capital, but has never showed 
tendency to undercapitalization in its now almost 70 years history (White and White, 1991; 
Morrison, 1997). Starting from scratch at the beginning of the 1950s, the Mondragon group is 
now composed by about 250 grass-root cooperatives and has been able to invest in several 
countries  and  in  different  continents,  employing  at  the  present  date  about  100  thousand 
workers.  Other,  though  less  impressive  examples  exist.  A  notable  number  of  worker 
cooperatives in central Italy, whose self-finance is almost completely made of accumulation of 
indivisible reserves, became  leader in competitive markets in sectors characterized by high 
capital intensity, for example in ceramic tile production. Correspondingly, the phenomenon of 
employee  owned  companies  has  been  spreading  in  the  United  Kingdom  showing  that 
companies owned by their employees, when able to perform on competitive markets, do not 
find  relevant  difficulties  in  being  supported  by  financial  markets  and  in  investing  owned 
resources  in  an  efficient  way.
8  Similar  evidence  came  from  the  spread  of  plywood 
                                                 
8 As said, some employee owned companies in the UK do accumulate common capital assets, usually in the 
form of trust funds, while other do not (Erdal, 2011).   10 
cooperatives in the US Pacific North West since, in the second half of last century, these 
cooperatives  reached  about  one  quarter  of  the  total  US  production  in  this  sector  by 
outperforming similar investor owned companies (Craig and Pencavel, 1992, 1993, 1994).  
 
2.3. Towards an integrative perspective 
The most stable and successful cooperatives and employee owned companies are often 
characterized by a mixed capital structure whereby part of the capital is held in common, but 
substantial amounts are also owned individually by members. This evidence foreshadows the 
possibility that the capital of the cooperative may optimally be composed by different parts 
serving starkly different purposes: the stabilization of the firm capital and the building of 
collateral guarantees in the case of indivisible resources; members’ financial involvement and 
firm performance in the case of individual quotas. The emergence of a capital structure that is 
composed  by  different  elements  appears  coherent  with  the  nature  cooperative  firms  since 
capital  is  not  the  controlling  factor  of  production  (Jossa  and  Cuomo,  1997),  while  its 
accumulation is instrumental to the pursuit of mutual benefit objectives (Borzaga and Tortia, 
2010).  
Given  the  different  categories  of  self-finance,  in  terms  of  both  common  and 
individualized ownership, it is necessary to ask what kind of costs are attached to different 
financial  sources.  As  introduced  in  previous  paragraphs,  individualized  self-finance  can 
engender  relevant  costs  connected  with  members'  turn-over,  different  time  horizons  in 
investment plans, and different members’ objectives. When disagreement about investment 
plans is pronounced, members may become less loyal to the organization. Increased turnover 
can weaken the financial structure of the firm due to increased capital variability. Costs in this 
case are mainly connected with the contractual position of members and with their turnover. 
The existence of contractual costs connected with the individual position of members can be at 
least partially addressed by resorting to indivisible, common sources of capital since, as said, 
in this case the costs linked to turnover are excluded or limited. Turnover costs can still be 
present in an implicit form since, even in the presence of common capital resources, members' 
with shorter time horizons may privilege insufficient investment plans.
9 On the other hand, 
however, when members' median temporal horizon is sufficiently long, the heterogeneity of 
members preferences about investment plans is not likely to do harm to the firm ability to 
invest in an efficient way. Quite clearly, common capital resources engender lower contractual 
costs than individualized sources of capital. This may be one of the main reasons why, where 
the accumulation of common capital resources is sufficiently regulated by law, cooperatives 
show a pronounced tendency to prefer common over individualized sources of capital. This is 
not to say, however, that common capital resources do not engender any kind of cost. Indeed, 
the costs connected with the accumulation and use of common resources can be substantial 
when proper regulation is not developed (Borzaga and Tortia, 2005). Even in the presence of 
collective  governance  of  the  accumulation  and  use  of  common  capital  resources  conflict 
resolution  and  other  decision  making  costs  can  be  high.  Hence,  the  contractual  costs 
connected with the individual position of members are to balanced with the costs of governing 
the  accumulation  and  use  of  common  capital  resources.
10  Individualized  sources  of  self-
                                                 
9 Also members disagreeing with the firm investment plans may privilege suboptimal investment levels. This 
source  of  sub-optimality  can  in  most  cases  be  assimilated  to  the  presence  of  a  limited  time  horizon  since 
disagreeing members will more often look for available outside options.   
10 As it is well-known, Hansmann (1996) identifies in the costs of collective decision making the most relevant 
weakness of cooperative firms, and above all of worker cooperatives. I have shown in this section that also the   11 
finance can still be appealing in many cases, both because the govern of common resources 
may be too difficult of costly, and because financial involvement can foster productivity and 
favor more efficient investment choices. The equilibrium between common and individualized 
sources of finance can ensue from the balance between the costs of governance summed to the 
loss  of  efficiency  that  are  connected  with  common  ownership,  and  the  contractual  costs 
summed to the efficiency gains that are connected with individual ownership of capital shares. 
As it has been explained in the foregoing paragraphs, this equilibrium is crucially influenced 
by  the  legal  frame  and  by  the  quality  of  internal  regulation  in  terms  of  governance  and 
working rules.  
The  foregoing  arguments  show  that  the  optimal  choice  of  common  vis  à  vis 
individualized self-finance is necessarily subject to substantial variability, depending on legal 
and internal regulation, and on the necessity to set different appropriate mixes of economic 
incentives.  A  new  interpretation  of  the  problem  of  self-finance  in  cooperatives  in  which 
governance costs (connected with common resources) are balanced against contractual and 
decision  making  costs  (connected  with  individualized  resources)  can  help  to  single  out 
effective  solutions.  This  new  perspective,  which  rests  clearly  within  a  new-institutionalist 
framework, is to be added, and it is not necessarily in contrast with the more traditional and 
orthodox perspective, which instead analyzes self-financed investment choices exclusively in 
terms  of  allocative  efficiency  based  on  standard  criteria  of  optimality.  Furthermore,  the 
modalities  and  the  process  of  establishment  and  continuation  of  these  different  financial 
components  are  still  widely  left  to  the  initiative  of  individual  cooperatives  or  group  of 
cooperatives, while the search for regularities and policy prescription may contribute to create 
more  reliable  patterns  of  cooperative  development.  To  these  questions  I  will  try  to  give 
tentative answers in the following pages, which also include a more in depth description of 
institutional variety in different countries and regions.    
 
3. The emergence of common resources in cooperative firms. In search for 
regularities  
Given the general framework described in the preceding section, it is now possible to 
analyze more closely the variables impacting on the accumulation of common resources. The 
observed heterogeneity is related in this case to the  structural features of the organization 
and/or sector at hand. The ability to single out the causal connections between these structural 
features  and  the  observed  accumulation  of  indivisible  reserves  can  add  insights  in  the 
understanding of their pattern of development.  
One initial source of the necessity to introduce indivisible reserves can be found in the 
heterogeneity of the membership. When members’ characteristics and preferences are similar 
contractual costs connected to the individual position of members are lower and it is easier to 
coordinate investment choices based on individual financial stakes. The existence of similar 
investment  preferences  and  of  similar  temporal  horizons  can  reduce  problems  linked  to 
members’ turn-over and to the variability of capital. It can also reduce the costs connected 
with  conflicting  preferences  and  choices.  When  these  stringent  conditions  are  met, 
individualized investments heighten financial inclusion and can be able to foster productivity 
in a fashion similar to profit sharing (Kruse, 1992).  In the most extreme cases, it can be 
possible  to  implement  the  so-called  “market  for  membership  rights”,  in  which  quitting 
members are allowed to sell to new-comer members their control rights as members of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
individual contractual position of members can engender substantial costs for the cooperative. Hence the need to 
balance collective and individual costs.   12 
cooperative (Dow, 1993, 1996, 2003). This kind of solution is rarely observed, but there are 
well-known  examples  of  groups  of  cooperatives  that  have  implemented  the  market  for 
membership rights. The best known example is represented by the plywood cooperatives in 
the US Pacific North West. The extreme homogeneity in the labor force (plywood coops were 
composed exclusively by lumberjack wood workers who were assigned the same job tasks on 
a job rotation basis) and the strong financial involvement (members had a strong interest in 
increasing labor productivity since this equated to increased market value of their membership 
rights) are reported to have contributed to creation of very competitive companies, able to 
outperform investor owned firms with similar characteristics (Craig and Pencavel, 1992, 1993, 
1994;  Pencavel,  2001).  These  very  appealing  features  notwithstanding,  the  market  for 
memberships  rights  is  reported  to  undergo  also  severe  limitations.  It  requires  strong 
homogeneity  in  members’  features  in  order  to  attach  meaningful  prices  to  the  bundle  of 
individual rights. Consequently, when cooperatives grow in size and differentiate production 
and membership features, such kind of market is rarely observed. Furthermore, the market for 
membership rights is easily subject to the problem of demutualization since in many instances 
it can be convenient for members to sell their ownership rights to external investors and not to 
new  incoming  members.
11  The  introduction  of  indivisible  reserves  or  the  reinvestment  of 
positive  residuals  into  trust  funds  represent  solutions  that  can  deal  with  members’ 
heterogeneity. In this case the introduction of common ownership appears as an emerging 
collective  institution  implying  that  the  institutional  features  of  the  organization  cannot  be 
reduced any more to a collection of individual membership positions, but acquire instead a 
social dimension of their own.
12   
Membership  heterogeneity  and  capital  variability  are  likely  to  result  in  stringent 
consequences for the firm financial viability, and this can be studied by considering at least 
two additional dimensions: firm dimension and conflict resolution. The growth of members’ 
heterogeneity goes hand in hand with dimensional growth. The two aspects clearly overlap in 
influencing the need to implement collective solutions for the firm financial needs, even if 
they are not equivalent and significant differences can be observed in different organizations 
and  in  different  sectors  of  activity.  The  increase  in  members’  heterogeneity  and  in  firm 
dimension is likely to be connected with heightened costs of conflicts. The emerging risk of 
conflict and the connected costs have been widely documented by the literature on common 
resources pools, starting from the Ostrom case studies in 1990. The introduction of common 
ownership internalizes the costs of conflict by transforming them from costs connected to 
individual  contractual  positions  to  the  costs  of  governing  complex  organizational  process. 
                                                 
11 Though this is not the main topic of this work, it must be noted that the existing literature discussed in detail 
the main limitations of the market for membership rights (for example Ellerman, 1997; Tortia, 2006). Among 
these: (1) when quitting members are allowed to sell their membership rights, the matching between incoming 
members and the preference expressed by incumbent members can be problematic since the purchase is based 
on the ability to pay of the incoming member more than on his/her suitability as member of the cooperative; (2) 
connectedly, incoming members can be financially constrained and not able to gather the resources necessary to 
buy the membership position; (3) when the market shows pronounced imperfections connected to the process of 
quitting  the  organization  and  reselling  membership  rights,  risks  of  ex-post  hold  up  and  morally  hazardous 
behaviors against incoming members who invested significant parts of their personal wealth in the membership 
position can become relevant. This again can result in reduced willingness to pay by newcomers. This way the 
market reaches suboptimal equilibrium whereby reduced willingness or ability to pay is matched by a preference 
given to the sale of the company to external investors. In a more succinct way “new workers often do not have 
the resources or credit to buy a membership share, … they are hired as non-member employees” Ellerman, 
1997, p. 68). Indeed, almost all plywood cooperatives were sold out to capitalist corporations upon retirement of 
the founding members.     
12 For a non-reductionist understanding of the emergence of collective institutions the reader can consult the rich 
evolutionary literature in this field, for example Hodgson (1993, 2006).    13 
Dimensional growth can shift the balance of attaining the most efficient governance solution 
from individual contractual positions to collective governance. 
A  third  important  dimension  under  which  the  accumulation  and  use  of  common 
resources is to be observed concerns the ability of the firm to generate high value added and 
the modalities in which economic value is reinvested to self-finance investment programs. The 
arguments put forward in the previous pages evidenced that indivisible reserves are functional 
to  the  solution  of  various  collective  choice  problems  and  social  dilemmas,  such  as  the 
stabilization of the firm capital and the governance of the growing heterogeneity in members' 
features. Once common resources have achieved these results, their increase may even be 
detrimental  at  the  margin  to  the  performance  of  the  organization,  as  evidenced  in  the 
undercapitalization  literature.  This  problem  is  especially  evident  in  worker  cooperatives 
operating high value added and profitable activities. The reason is that, for such activities, the 
reinvestment of the whole amount of net residuals into indivisible reserves would amount to 
the renouncement by the membership to the whole extra-gains generated by firms specific 
investments and other competitive advantages. Failure to find adequate solutions to the need 
of attributing extra-gains to members who have carried out the relevant investment plans in 
the past represents a relevant economic incentive against the creation of cooperative ventures 
in such sectors of activity (Major, 1996). The lack of creation of cooperatives in high value 
added sectors is clearly detrimental to the development and spread of this organizational form. 
The empirical evidence seems to speak in favor of this interpretation. In countries in which 
cooperatives reinvest all or the greatest part of their positive residuals in indivisible reserves, 
cooperatives  are  reported  to  self-select  themselves  into  in  high  labor  intensive,  low  value 
added  sectors.  On  the  contrary,  when  mechanisms  for  the  individualized  appropriation  of 
substantial parts of the net residuals are introduced, as it happens in the Mondragon case, also 
worker cooperatives have proved to be able to generate high value added and residuals. This 
evidence confirms that common resources in cooperatives fulfill an insurance and stability 
function,  more  than  a  performance  function.  These  arguments  support  the  creation  of 
mechanisms  that  allow  members  to  appropriate  extra-gains  deriving  from  firm  specific 
investments. They also advise the creation of mechanisms that establish a positive correlation 
between the share of the net residual distributed or reinvested individually, and the percentage 
of  extra-gains  (quasi  rents)  out  of  the  total  net  surplus.  Among  the  easiest  mechanisms 
supporting this kind of outcome, net residuals can be attributed to members either in cash, in 
the form of end-of the year rebates or patronage refunds, or though reinvestment of such 
patronage  refunds  into  individualized  capital  quotas,  as  it  happens  in  the  Mondragon 
cooperatives.
13     
The fourth element that can contribute crucially to the spread of common resources in 
cooperatives is the social relevance of the firm activity. When cooperative firms carry out 
activities with a community or social relevance, then often take up structural and operational 
features  that  are  more  and  more  similar  to  non-profit  organizations,  such  as  charities, 
foundations, and associations. This implies, as a norm, that larger shares or the whole net 
residual is reinvested into indivisible reserves, whose function is connected with the pursuit of 
the  social  mission  more  than  with  the  enforcement  of  mutual  benefit  ends.  While  most 
cooperatives  have  a  purely  mutual-benefit  nature,  and  most  nonprofit  organizations  are 
exclusively guided by their social mission, intermediate forms do exist, and some examples 
can be put forward. Social cooperatives have been introduced first in Italian legislation in 
1991 and later on in many other countries (about fifteen are counted to date) (Borzaga and 
                                                 
13 Other solutions can be envisaged and have been implemented in different groups of cooperatives in different 
countries and regions. I will not introduce here a precise taxonomy of these institutional solutions.    14 
Becchetti, 2010). Social enterprises have been introduced first in the UK in 2005 and then in 
Italy in 2006, while various other similar reform projects are going to be completed in other 
countries inside and outside Europe. In the Italian and UK legislation, social enterprise can, 
but do not need to, take up the legal form of cooperatives. These and other organizational 
forms  (also  community  development  cooperatives  could  be  cited)  represent  instances  that 
strive  to  reconcile  a  mutual  benefit  governance  with  the  public  benefit  relevance  of  their 
activity.  While  inclusion  is  guaranteed  by  stakeholder  participation,  like  in  traditional 
cooperatives, the pursuit of the social mission is usually enforced by the explicit statement of a 
public  benefit  aim,  and  by  reinvestment  of  the  greatest  part  of  residuals  into  indivisible 
reserves that are exclusively directed to the achievement of that aim.  
 
4. The governance of common-pool resources in cooperative firms 
The  previous  section  have  highlighted  the  features  and  the  main  reasons  for  the 
emergence of common capital resources in cooperatives. This section is going to focus on the 
governance of such resources. The very existence of common resources call for appropriate 
governance mechanisms to eschew the risks linked with conflicting individual objectives. The 
literature on common-pool resources evidenced that governing common resources is a process 
strictly  connected  with  control  mechanisms  and  conflict  resolution.  The  main  conditions 
allowing their effective exploitation in the presence of scarcity and rivalry, i.e. in a tragedy of 
the  commons  situation  have  been  spelled  out  as  they  relate  to  three  main  elements:  the 
possibility  for  appropriators  to  participate  in  the  gathering  activity  and  reap  its  fruit;  the 
prevention and settlement of conflicts; the control of the behavior of the appropriators and the 
punishment of those appropriators not abiding with collective decisions. The governance of 
common  resources  in  cooperatives  is  characterized  by  similar  problems.  Taking  the 
accumulation of indivisible reserves as an instance of common-pool resources in cooperatives, 
members need to be allowed to participate in decisions concerning the pace of accumulation 
and the strategic decisions on investment programs. Participatory governance represents an 
enabling feature of the governance structure as it corresponds to the “one member, one vote” 
rule. It is functional to the expression of needs, objectives and preferences to be taken into 
account  (Sacchetti  and  Tortia,  2010).  This  correspondence  between  the  governance  of 
cooperatives and of common-pool resources reveals the affinity between two phenomena that 
have not been compared enough to date. Beyond similarities, however, it must be added that 
the strictly entrepreneurial nature of cooperative firm can add new dimensions to the working 
of participatory governance. Strategic planning of investments aimed at achieving innovative 
outputs and the frequent introduction of new technologies are examples showing the added 
complexity when new steps are taken from the simple exploitation of existing resources to 
integrated production processes.  
The  participative  features  of  governance  are  underpinned  by  control  and  conflict 
resolution mechanisms. The endemic emergence of conflict over the accumulation and use of 
capital resources require that mechanisms supervising and settling such conflicts need to be 
put in place. The most relevant dimension involving mechanisms of control and punishment 
concern the way in which common resources are employed, since different investment plans 
and typologies (e.g. productive vis à vis financial investments) can benefit some constituencies 
more  than  others  (e.g.  managers  vis  à  vis  workers).  Control  policies  need  to  serve  the 
satisfaction of the needs expressed by the relevant constituencies of the cooperatives, that is 
the membership base.  Control over the utilization of acquired physical assets needs to be put 
in place as well in terms of detection of misuse or excessive exploitation of physical assets. 
The above mentioned three dimensions of governance always exist and are independent of the   15 
size and complexity of the organization also in terms of heterogeneity in members’ features. 
Peer  pressure,  even  when  it  is  purely  informal,  can  be  considered  the  basic  horizontal 
mechanisms that, in cooperatives, creates scope for control and punishment of defectors. At 
the substantive level, peer pressure  is coherent with reciprocating behavior, which is reported 
by  some  author  (Zamagni,  2005)  to  lie  at  the  heart  of  the  very  notion  of  cooperative 
productive effort. One of the main functions of peer pressure is the enforcement of basic 
learning processes and the accumulation of firm-specific competencies. When defection in 
terms of free-riding or other morally hazardous behaviors is observed, the use of graduated 
punishment on the basis of the seriousness of offences against cooperative effort becomes 
apparent. Graduated punishment is indeed central in both the empirical literature of common 
pool resources (Ostrom, 1990) and in the now established experimental literature on public 
good games (Fehr and Gachter, 2000). The increase in the harm produced is usually matched 
by  an  equal  or  more  than  proportional  increase  in  the  punishment  of  the  defector.  More 
formalized  and  better  enforced  procedures  are  expected  in  larger  and  more  complex 
organizations, but the basic mechanisms based on participation and reciprocity represent the 
backbone of cooperative effort at any dimensional and complexity level. 
 
5. An international comparison of cooperative firm typologies 
A useful initial empirical approach to the analysis of the patterns of  emergence and  
diffusion of common resources in cooperatives is the comparative one at the country-legal 
level. The study of different legal systems can serve the production of novel scientific inquiry.  
The  study  of  the  operation  of  different  legal  systems  is  similar  to  the  implementation  of 
“quasi-natural” experiments since different rules result in different behaviors and outcomes, 
whose study and comparison can lead to evidence the relevant patterns of development.  In the 
case of cooperative firms important differences are observed across countries. This is true both 
in  Europe  and  North-America,  the  two  main  context  that  I  am  going  to  consider.  The 
comparative  effort,  which  considers  many  countries,  can  be  implemented  by  grouping 
different  legal  systems  within  a  limited  number  of  institutional  traditions  represented  in 
macro-regions.  The  simplification  induced  by  the  creation  of  a  limited  number  of  groups 
favors  the  tractability  of  the  comparative  analysis.  At  the  same  time,  while  kept  in  the 
background,  within  group  differences  can  still  be  relevant  for  the  explanation  of  specific 
phenomena.  
The need for  simplification leads to consider only three macro-regional systems. The 
first one includes mainly countries rules by common law, mostly Anglo-Saxon countries such 
as the US, the UK and Australia. In these countries the presence of indivisible reserves in not 
required by law and, coherently, it is often absent. The structure of owned resources is usually 
made of contributions by individual members, who own saleable shares of the firm assets. The 
mechanisms regulating the accumulation and exchange of individual shares is mostly left open 
to  regulation  by  individual  cooperatives.  Self-regulation  can  put  various  constraints  on 
exchange of individual shares, both among members and with external investors. In the latter 
case restrictions are especially needed, since the sale of shares to external investors can result 
in  demutualization.  Beyond  markets  for  membership  shares,  also  markets  for  membership 
rights  are  not  forbidden  by  law  and  are  at  times  implemented.  However,  because  of  the 
imperfections highlighted in Section 3, this type of solution is rarely observed also in common 
law countries, for example in the UK. While these systems have stressed private ownership as 
the  main  proprietary  vehicle  for  the  development  of  cooperatives,  various  instances  of 
common ownership have tended to emerge spontaneously in individual cooperatives. One of 
the main reasons for the emergence of common ownership instances in common law countries   16 
is that this kind of regime, as said, is not impermeable to demutualization. While law posed 
weak  constrains  on  demutualization,  many  individual  cooperatives  and  employee  owned 
companies  have  introduced  statutory  regulation  that  limits  this  possibility.  This  is  usually 
effected by limiting the sale of shares both among members and to external investors, and by 
introducing a substantial role for assets held in common, which cannot be appropriated by 
members upon quitting the firm, or upon closure. This way the choice of demutualization 
becomes highly impractical since the membership has a strong interest to retain control over 
the trusted funds. Various examples can be put forward. Forms of complete asset lock are still 
used by the so called “common ownership firms” in England (Ellerman, 1997). In this case the 
stress is put on common ownership rights as the sole or main vehicle for economic democracy 
in  production.  Less  extreme  and  partial  form  of  common  ownership  characterize  many 
employee owned companies in the form of trust funds, in which a substantial part of the firm 
net residuals are reinvested on a yearly basis. One of the best known examples is the John 
Lewis Partnership in the UK. John Lewis was sold to its employees about 80 years ago by its 
former owners and founders. Over the decades it has proven to be an economically sustainable 
and highly competitive venture. John Lewis is nowadays one of the best performing retailers 
in the UK. Assets held in trust are exclusive ownership of the organization, implying that 
individual members do not have legal claim on its value. At least in principle this form of 
common ownership does not prevent demutualization, since the value of the trust contributes 
to the market value of the company.  
The second macro-regional system includes those countries in which common property 
in the form of indivisible reserves is imposed by law, though not in an exclusive way. This 
group includes mainly continental European countries, such as France, Spain, and Italy. In 
these countries, legislation requires cooperatives to reinvest part of their net surpluses into 
indivisible  reserves.  For  example,  the  Italian  legislation,  which  is  based  on  the  so  called 
“Basevi  law”  passed  by  the  Italian  Parliament  in  1947,  requires  all  cooperative  forms  to 
reinvestment of at least 30 per cent of net surpluses, while cooperative banks are required to 
reinvest at least 70 per cent. The rational of these legal constraints rests with the necessity to 
strengthen the patrimony directly owned by the organization, independently of the individual 
financial  position  of  members.  It  must  be  said  that,  at  least  in  the  Italian  case,  most 
cooperative are used to reinvest in indivisible reserves much larger shares of net surpluses 
than what is required by law. Indeed, most Italian cooperatives are used to reinvest all of their 
surplus in indivisible reserves. The crucial role of common ownership in the Italian case is 
likely to have been favored by the fiscal advantages granted by law.
14 However, it can also 
testimony the important economic functions that indivisible reserves (as evidenced in Section 
2) have in guaranteeing financial sustainability and patrimonial stability (Navarra, 2010). As it 
appears, these economic functions are spontaneously recognized and endorsed by individual 
cooperatives.  Legislations in these countries show also important differences,  for example 
concerning the destination of the residual value of the organization upon termination of the 
activity.  While  in  Italy  members  cannot  recoup  any  of  the  residual  value  of  indivisible 
reserves, which is destined to a national mutual fund financing new start-ups of cooperatives, 
in France members can share such residual value. In the Italian system, the appropriation of 
the residual value of the firm by incumbent members is prevented by law since this value is 
considered the result of savings created by past generations of members. If some residual 
value is left, this is to be considered social ownership. The French solution is clearly more 
favorable to the private appropriation of residual assets. In this second group of legal systems, 
                                                 
14 Before the reform of corporate law 181/2003, reinvestments of net residuals in indivisible reserves were 
granted complete tax exemption, while after 2003 fiscal advantages became partial as they are granted only up 
to a limited percentage of reinvested net residuals.    17 
when indivisible reserves do not embrace the whole value of the firm owned assets, various 
forms of individualized ownership are introduced. These forms, as a norm, are more similar to 
members loans than to shares. In some cases, like in the Mondragon group in Spain, individual 
capital  shares  are  built  through  the  reinvestment  of  patronage  end-of-the-year  refunds 
(Ellerman, 1997). Members recoup the value of these financial instrument upon quitting the 
organization or upon retirement, i.e. only when their status as members of the cooperative is 
extinguished.  
The third group of cooperative systems includes those countries in which all the owned 
assets are constituted by common or social ownership. Contrary to the initial two cases, this 
kind of system does not allow individual ownership of assets. Consequently, it does not allow 
the  endogenous  emergence  of  an  optimal  partition  between  individualized  and  common 
ownership. The obvious example is represented by the former self-management system in 
Yugoslavia, which disappeared following the economic reforms at the beginning of the 1990s. 
While fully-blown social ownership is nowadays not endorsed by any national cooperative 
system, organizational forms that closely resemble this kind of system can be detected among 
entrepreneurial nonprofits pursuing public-benefit aims (Weisbrod, 1988; Hansmann, 1988). 
As said, however, socialized ownership of assets in this kind of organization, for example 
social cooperatives and social enterprises, is functional to the pursuit of social, not of mutual 
benefit goals. Figure 1 represent in a synthetic way the different macro-regional cooperative 
system groupings, as described in this section. 
Figure 1 about here 
 
5.1. The performance of different cooperative systems 
The focus of the so-defined “Anglo-Saxon” model is clearly on individual control and 
ownership. The basic rationale of this system is the attempt to link individual membership 
rights with the individual ownership of assets in a way to widen as much as possible financial 
participation and, eventually, performance. Indeed, the example of the plywood cooperatives 
and  of  many  cases  of  employee  owned  companies,  for  example  in  the  UK,  shows  that 
individualized  ownership  can  impact  very  positively  on  productivity  and  competitiveness. 
Against this evidence, it is necessary to stress also the recent spontaneous reemergence of 
partial  forms  of  common  ownership,  both  the  asset  lock  and  trust  funds  within  the  same 
institutional  tradition.  The  overall  process  undergone  by  cooperatives  in  the  Anglo-Saxon 
tradition  appears  steered  by  the  necessity  to  reconcile  performance  and  stability,  to  allow 
competitiveness on the market and, at the same time, to eschew the risk of demutualization. 
This process, which has been widely spontaneous, is coherent with the arguments put forward 
in  the  Section  2,  since  the  growing  need  to  coordinate  an  increasingly  heterogeneous 
membership,  and  to  stabilize  the  patrimony  of  the  firm,  seem  to  have  advised  many 
organizations to overcome a strictly individualistic approach to firm ownership, even if this 
may come with some loss of efficiency and performance potential.  
The model that spread in continental Europe appears more balanced and stable at the 
outset since it has been able to reconcile both collective and individualistic elements. This 
model appear, however, maybe also because of the favorable fiscal incentives, to have tended 
towards  quite  extreme  forms  of  common  ownership,  and  its  ability  to  reach  adequate 
performance has been questioned by many commentators. While stability and resilience to 
change and crisis have been the most positive features of the continental European model, and 
above all of the Italian version of it, competitiveness has often been limited to the degree 
necessary to spread in traditional, low value added sectors. The upshot has been a form of   18 
enterprise that is able to last several decades, in many cases more than one century, but that 
has found significant difficulties in spreading in the system at large.
15   
The  empirical  evidence  shows  that  cooperatives  are  more  widespread,  shown  more 
longevity and resiliency to crisis, and are of larger dimensions in countries like Italy in which 
reinvestment  of  net  residuals  in  indivisible  reserves  is  required  by  law  and  represent  a 
dominant course of action. This outcome is observed in connection with the impossibility to 
appropriate the residual value of the firm even upon termination of activities. Hence, the stress 
on common ownership and on the collective aspects of control appears to show the superior 
long  term  performance  of  continental  European  cooperatives.  However,  the  arguments 
developed  in  this  paper  seem  to  advise  that  this  system  is  reformed  in  the  direction  of 
requiring  more  substantial  financial  participation  by  individual  members  in  order  to  favor 
better performance, without waiving stability. The direction to be taken is found in widening 
the  utilization  of  the  various  forms  of  individual  capital  shares,  for  example  loans  or 
redeemable, non equity capital shares. In more general terms, members need to be allowed to 
appropriate  extra-gain  ensuing  from  firm-specific  investments  over  and  above  the 
accumulation  of  common  resources  required  to  guarantee  financial  sustainability  and 
patrimonial stability. One initial mechanism allowing the attainment of this objective can be 
the legal imposition not only of a lower bond, but also of a upper bond to the share of net 
residuals that is to be reinvested in indivisible reserves.      
 
6. Concluding remarks and policy implications 
 This  paper  represent  an  attempt  to  reformulate  the  problem  of  asset  ownership  in 
cooperative firms by looking at it from a new perspective, one which explicitly considers 
common ownership as viable and relevant institutional solution. The initial stimulus comes 
from the bourgeoning literature concerning the governance of common-pool resources, which, 
however,  has  been  almost  exclusively  developed  in  dealing  with  the  management  and 
exploitation of natural resources. The adaptation of the common-pool approach to the study of 
entrepreneurial  organizations  has  led  to  consider  mutual  benefit  organizations  such  as 
cooperatives  as  the  entrepreneurial  forms  that  most  closely  reproduce  the  features  of  the 
management of common-pool resources both in terms of inclusive governance and in terms of 
common  asset  ownership.  The  spontaneous  emergence  of  different  forms  of  common 
ownership in cooperatives, but also their legal regulation clearly demonstrate the relevance of 
this phenomenon. Indeed, the arguments developed in this paper lead to conclude in favor of a 
positive and wide, but non exclusive role for common ownership in cooperative firm. The 
stabilization of the firm capital, the building of collateral guarantee and of insurance funds, 
and the support given to the dimensional growth of the organization in the presence of an 
heterogeneous membership are the main recognized advantages of common property. Its main 
limitation in found in the lack of adequate economic incentives, and, mainly because of this 
reason,  in  the  limited  performance  induced  by  their  exclusive  implementation.  The  self-
selection  in  low  value  added  sectors  of  cooperatives  exclusively  supported  by  common 
ownership has been singled out as the most relevant evidence of this limited performance 
potential. The solution proposed points at a mix of different capital resources with different 
functions directed to reconcile individual and collective objectives, stability and performance. 
                                                 
15   In  most  legal  systems  cooperatives  are  allowed  to  created  and  absorb  controlled  investor-owned 
companies. This is mainly done in order to gather adequate financial support and, in some cases, to improve 
production efficiency. Cooperative controlling investor owned companies are often able to grow much beyond 
the original dimension of the original mutualistic organization.   19 
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